Abstract

Perhaps one of the main attributes of the subjectivity is temporality in the metaphysical tradition. Subject cannot be found in space, it only exists in time, so the substantial concept of mind originates in the notion of time. On the other side the subject perceives time as such; as Saint Augustine writes in *Confessions*, "It is in thee, my mind, that I measure times" (Augustine, 2005, p. 217). Temporality and subjectivity were closely related notions before the transcendental turn. In his explicit argumentation Immanuel Kant considers the subject as a temporal principle; as he writes in *The End of All Things*, "thinking contains a reflecting, which can occur only in time" (Kant, 2001, p. 227). However, Kant does not affirm that the apperception of "ego cogito" can lead to the substantial existence of subject or mind. He regards this deduction as a paralogism. The Kantian disaffirmation of substantial mind enabled the timeless concept of subjectivity in the Early German Idealism.

The subjectivity notion of Kant and the transcendental philosophy has a special, ambiguous character: in their explicit theories they argue that the subject is mainly a temporal entity, but some special forms of the general subject (transcendental subject, self, Gemüt etc.) are placed out of time in several texts. In the paper I analyse the temporal aspects of the idealist subject concept. The main thesis of the paper is that the subject of the transcendental philosophy is characterised by atemporal temporality.

Keywords: Kant, Schelling, subjectivity, atemporal temporality, Gemüt

---

1 Supported by the ÚNKP-21-4 New National Excellence Program of the Ministry for Innovation and Technology from the source of the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund.
In search of a contradiction: what does the atemporality of the subject mean?

A closer look at transcendental philosophy’s understanding of time reveals a particularly interesting and worrying contradiction. On the one hand, we find numerous passages in the works of Kant, Fichte or even Schelling that assert the fundamental temporality of the subject, while on the other hand, these authors argue more than once for the very transcendental subject’s being beyond time. At first sight, it is not easy to decide how transcendental philosophy judges the relationship between time and subjectivity.

One of the best examples of the inherent temporality of the subject is Immanuel Kant’s essay *The End of All Things*. This late essay is relevant for us because it focuses on the possibility of eternity and thus provides important contributions to our understanding of Kant’s conception of time. On the other hand, it is also important for Kant’s life in general, since in this text the philosopher from Königsberg ironically criticises the religious regulations of the Prussian state, in response to which the royal letter ordering Kant to take orders is written (Cassirer, 1981, p. 393–394). Only one seemingly incidental remark is relevant to the present discussion:

> But that at some point a time will arrive in which all alteration (and with it, time itself) ceases—this is a representation which outrages the imagination. For then the whole of nature will be rigid and as it were petrified: the last thought, the last feeling in the thinking subject will then stop and remain forever the same without any change. For a being which can become conscious of its existence and the magnitude of this existence (as duration) only in time, such a life—if it can even be called a life—appears equivalent to annihilation, because in order to think itself into such a state it still has to think something in general, but *thinking* contains a reflecting, which can occur only in time. (Kant, 2001, p. 227; AA 8, p. 334.)

According to Kant, we simply cannot imagine a total absence of time. The human mind is bound to time because, as the most emancipatory property of thought, it necessarily presupposes change. Kant adds that even the finite rational being can conceive of the eternal existence of pure reason only through repetition. The timelessness of angels, for example, is imagined by their singing the same song forever, repeating it cyclically. The subject is unable to adequately represent the timeless to itself—it cannot assign a perspective to the idea, but only, as it does in its *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, gives it a symbolic hypotyposis—because it is itself a temporal being (Kant, 2002, p. 225–226; AA 5, p. 351–353). The idea also appears, among other places, in the *Critique of Pure Reason,*
where Kant argues that “I am unable to grasp my soul through cognition (whether by speculative reason or by the process of empirical observation), since I should regard it as not temporally determined” (Kant, 1998, p. 116; AA 3, p. 18).

Accordingly, the subject is inherent in its temporality, the subject itself is a temporal entity. At the same time, as I mentioned earlier, the idea of the atemporality of the subject also appears in the transcendental philosophical tradition. Friedrich Schelling, in his 1800 book *The System of Transcendental Idealism*, admittedly wanted to create a system of transcendental philosophy that was only in a form of critique in the works of Kant (Kant, 1998, p. 150–151; AA 3, p. 44–45). The text outlines a position that precisely asserts the atemporal nature of essential subjectivity.

Schelling seeks the unity of being and imagination, subject and object, which he finds in consciousness (Schelling, 2001, p. 23–25). The act of consciousness is a completely free act which creates the concept of the self. The self cannot be understood disregarding this act, it is itself an act of consciousness and thus exists solely in this act. This self is “infinitely non-objective”; he says that “the self is pure act, a pure doing, which simply has to be non-objective in knowledge” (Schelling, 2001, p. 27). In this pure, substantial subject there is no room for any empirical trait; the transcendental subject is different from empirical consciousness, which is commonly called consciousness. This inherently non-objective self, which therefore cannot be said to be anything, not even to exist, is nevertheless made object by the self for itself. This is possible because the self itself is nothing other than an intellectual intuition, by which the self becomes both creator and created (Schelling, 2001, p. 27). Because the transcendental self, the pure subject, is devoid of any empirical reference, time in the ordinary sense of the word does not play a role for it either.

Schelling raises the question of how the philosopher is able to grasp the completely free act of self-consciousness, which is nevertheless absolutely necessary in the nature of the self, since it is this very act that creates the self. According to Schelling, philosophy is in fact a free imitation of the act of self-consciousness (Schelling, 2001, p. 48–49). The question arises: how is the philosopher able to recognise the original act of self-consciousness?

For if it is through self-consciousness that all limitation originates, and thus all time as well, this original act cannot itself occur in time; hence, of the rational being as such, one can no more say that it has begun to exist, than that it has existed for all time; the self as self is absolutely eternal, that is, outside time altogether. But now our secondary act necessarily occurs at a particular moment in time, and so how does the philosopher know this act, occurring in the middle of the time-series, to be coincident with that wholly extratemporal act whereby all time is first constituted? (Schelling, 2001, p. 48)
The most basic form of the subject, consciousness, is timeless in the sense that it is through it that time itself is created. The original self is eternal, and the repetition of the act of self-consciousness in every moment allows me to be constantly created for myself (Schelling, 2001, p. 48). The infinite contradictions of self-consciousness then create time, or the epochs of self-consciousness (Schelling, 2001, p. 49–50).

Anyone who perceives at all that the self arises only through its own acting, will also perceive that, through the arbitrary action in midst of the time-series whereby alone the self arises, nothing else can arise for me save what comes about for me originally and beyond all time. (Schelling, 2001, p. 48)

Consciousness therefore precedes time; time is created by its action. This trans-temporality seems to contradict the fundamental temporality of the subject as previously postulated. One might even think that this is only a difference between the positions of the two philosophers. There is no doubt that Schelling’s concept, briefly presented here, was fundamentally determined by Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, which, although it carries forward the Kantian transcendental philosophical project, nevertheless shows marked differences in its approach (Valastyán, 2011, p. 40–43).

Fichte finds the first, absolutely unconditioned principle of the science of knowledge in the proposition I = I, from which he wants to derive the whole structure of knowledge (Fichte, 1982, p. 93–99). Already in his conception, the idea appears that this absolute self is devoid of all contingent, empirical elements—it is the pure subject itself. Time as such only comes into being through the self-limiting activity of the self that posits itself realistically. The self also experiences in the resistance of the not-self that makes it temporal. Perhaps the most important of these factors is the emergence of causality, which limits the self through the assumption of the not-self. Without the causality created by the not-self, the self would be absurdly infinite.

The I is to be posited as an actual I, but solely in contrast with or in opposition to a Not-I. But there is a Not-I for the I only under the condition that the I acts efficaciously and feels resistance in its effective operation, which, however, is overcome, since otherwise the I would not be acting efficaciously. Only by means of such resistance does the activity of the I become something that can be sensed and that endures over a period of time, since without such resistance the I’s activity would be outside of time, which is something we are not even able to think. (Fichte, 2005, p. 89)

For the purposes of the present discussion, it is no longer relevant how the causal effect determines duration, or what concept of time Fichte develops (Acosta, 2014, p. 73–77).
It is clear from the above quotation that the Fichtean approach also reflects the paradoxical relationship between the self and time. The subject is something very much a temporal being, yet in some way it is the result of his/her activity that time itself is the result.

Despite the apparent contradiction, it seems clear that the subject in this philosophical paradigm can in no way be entirely atemporal; rather, the question is whether the subject itself in its most elementary form is outside time (whether it precedes time) or whether it has a fundamentally temporal character. Our task will be to interpret this ambiguity, this timeless temporality of the subject, the self. My aim is to interpret the relation between time and subjectivity within the framework of Kantian-based transcendental thought from historical perspective. In this paper, I seek the answer for one question: what is the relation of the transcendental subject, which has no ontological characteristic, to temporality? More precisely, what is the difference between the concept of infinite soul posited in finitude (idealist metaphysics) and the atemporal temporality of the mind (transcendental idealism); what are the consequences of the lack of ontological horizon for the temporality of the subject?

The subjectivity of the Kantian concept of time

In this paper I do not wish to comment on the role of time in transcendental philosophy in general. Nor is it my aim to analyse the already diverse and in many respects contradictory Kantian conception of time in general. I do not attempt a phenomenological analysis of the Kantian conception of time (e.g. Heidegger or Ricoeur), since my aim here is not to reconstruct and analyse the concept of time in transcendental philosophy in detail, nor to undertake a phenomenological analysis of temporality, but to shed light on the difference between metaphysical timelessness and transcendental atemporality from a philosophical-historical point of view. Nor would it be uninteresting to analyse the Kantian notion of the historical beginning (Kant, 2007b, p. 163–164; AA 8, p. 109–111), or, for example, to examine schemata as a priori definitions of time (Kant, 1998, p. 275–276; AA 3, p. 138). Kant, writing about the schematism of pure concepts of the understanding, describes time as “the pure image (...) for all objects of the senses in general” (Kant, 1998, p. 274; AA 3, p. 137). Among the a priori determinations of time, he distinguishes the time-series, the content of time, the order of time and the sum total of time.

---

2 The multi-layered nature of the Kantian conception of time, which cannot be organized under a single narrative, has been examined in detail in Hungarian by Ottó Hévizi (2020).

3 In particular, the paper does not claim to account for the connection between self and time in contemporary phenomenology. Lajos Horváth (2018), for example, has written a thorough study on the relation between the minimal self and retroactivity.
(Kant, 1998, p. 276; AA 3, p. 138). While their a priori character, which determines our view, may help us to interpret the temporality of the subject in general terms, they would not contribute in any meaningful way to unravel the paradox that is our subject.

Instead, we need to clarify what the subjectivity of the Kantian conception of time means, since it is from this that we can reconstruct the relationship between time and the subject. Immanuel Kant (1992) came up with his subjective understanding of time in his professorial lecture in 1770. In the treatise *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World*, Kant conceives of time and space as a subjective principle of form of the mind, but by this he means a law of the soul that appears as a necessity (Kant, 1992, p. 391; AA 2, p. 398).

*The time is not something objective and real,* nor it is a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation. Time is rather the subjective condition which is necessary, in virtue of the nature of the human mind, for the coordinating of all sensible things in accordance with a fix law. It is a *pure intuition.* (Kant 1992, p. 393.; AA 2, p. 400)

It will be of great significance that Kant understands time as a necessary subjective condition of the mind. In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, he also emphasizes that the subjectivity of space and time should not be confused with the subjectivity of empirical, contingent phenomena (e.g. the taste of wine), since the concept of space and time can still be considered a priori objective (Kant, 1998, p. 161; AA 4, p. 34–35). Although Kant does not make any further distinction between forms of subjectivity at this point, he goes on to write about the transpersonal nature of subjectivity in the case of beauty in his *Critique of the Power of Judgement*: the generality of beauty is not based on comparative but on universal rules (Kant, 2002, p. 97–98; AA 5, p. 212–213). It follows that the subjectivity of time is more inherent than that of pleasure, since time is an a priori form of sensory perception.

Nevertheless, the subjectivity formulated in the inaugural lecture was interpreted by the critics of the thesis (Mendelssohn and Lambert) as psychological subjectivism; Kant’s idea was misunderstood as psychological idealism (Cassirer, 1981, p. 123–124). Mendelssohn, in a letter to Kant dated 25th of December 1770, argues precisely that time cannot be something purely subjective, but some kind of objectivity must play a role in the operation of succession (Kant, 1999, p. 124; AA 10, p. 115–116). In *Critique of Pure Reason*, published 11 years later, Kant himself indicates that his theory could easily be misunderstood. He did not dispute the empirical reality of time, but merely questioned its objectivity in the transcendental sense (Kant, 1998, p. 164–165; AA 3, p. 61). Time is real in the empirical sense, but ideal in the transcendental sense, for nothing remains of it if we abstract it from “the subjective conditions of sensible intuition” (Kant, 1998, p. 164; AA 3, p. 61).
Kant is quite clear in his dissociation from psychological idealism, and defines his own transcendental idealism as empirical realism (Kant, 1998, p. 121–122, 426; AA 3, p. 23; AA 4, p. 232). The transcendental realist (who is also a psychological or empirical idealist) questions the knowability of the external world, since I can only have direct knowledge of what is going on inside me. Yet I am conscious through inner experience of my existence in time (and consequently also of its determinability in time), and this is more than merely being conscious of my representation; yet it is identical with the empirical consciousness of my existence, which is only determinable through a relation to something that, while being bound up with my existence, is outside me." (Kant, 1998, p. 121; AA 3, p. 23)

Kant thus gives the concept of time a major role when he argues for the existence and knowability of the external world. The temporal existence of the subject underpins the existence of the world outside me, for without it I could not know my temporality.

According to Kant, then, space and time are a priori forms of perceptive vision, and in this sense they have a subjective character; moreover, time is the main representative of transcendental subjectivity (Kant, 1998, p. 115; AA 3, p. 17; Vető, 2019, p. 131). It is important to note, however, that although no knowledge of time precedes experience (Kant, 1998, p. 127; AA 3, p. 27), our purely a priori concepts (e.g. the general notion of causality) no longer presuppose the unconditional primacy of experience (Kant, 1998, p. 142–143; AA 3, p. 335). Kant, of course, ascribes to pure reason understood in this way essentially only a negative function, regarding the philosophy of pure reason as a discipline, as a dissipator of delusions (Kant, 1998, p. 672; AA 3, p. 517). At the same time, man has a spiritual need to see himself as something timeless:

as regards the first point, on that remarkable predisposition of our nature, noticeable to every human being, never to be capable of being satisfied by what is temporal (since the temporal is always insufficient for the predispositions of our whole vocation) leading to the hope of a future life. (Kant, 1998, p. 118, AA 3, p. 20)

This remark is of great significance for our topic, since Kant here exposes the motivation of the traditional (what he calls dogmatic) metaphysical conception of time. We are not able to accept our pure temporality, since that would presuppose our own contingency, our exclusive mortal nature. Dogmatic thinking is therefore forced to elaborate the timelessness of man in detail, distinguishing it from actual eternity.

---

4 In contrast, Kant shows in his anthropological writings that we do not have direct access to our own anima either. It is precisely through time as a formal condition for the internal contemplation of the subject that Kant shows that we do not have direct access to the content of the soul (Kant 2007a, p. 255; AA, 7, p. 142–143).

5 Tamás Valastyán (2013) analyzes the connection between the Kantian subject and the concept of hope.
I will give only one example of the old metaphysical thinking. Kant’s aforementioned colleague and friend, Moses Mendelssohn, also distinguishes the timelessness of the human soul from divine eternity: “at bottom, man will never partake of eternity; his eternity is merely an incessant temporality. His temporality never ends; it is, therefore, an essential part of his permanency and inseparable from it” (Mendelssohn, 1983, p. 39).

**Time and subject in traditional metaphysics**

It would be beyond the scope of this essay to review, even with relative thoroughness, the characteristics of the pre-Kantian metaphysical conception of time. The problem of time is already present in the very beginnings of metaphysical thought, since without it change and movement are unthinkable. As Aristotle notes, all his predecessors, asserted the uncreation of time, except Plato, who believed that time was created simultaneously with the heavens (Aristotle, 1999, 252b10). In *Timaeus*, Plato (2008, 37d) defines time as a moving image of eternity.

For us, however, it is more relevant to outline how subject and time were related in pre-Kantian metaphysical thought. First and foremost, we must emphasise the importance of Augustine, who, in addition to being a major contributor to the preparation of the modern concept of the subject, was also the most important precursor of the Cartesian notion of the cogito, which is the cornerstone of modern subject philosophies. From this point of view, we should be interested not so much in the question of certainty, but rather in the nature of the subject who, through his errors (his thinking), can arrive at this recognition of unquestionable validity, and who thus maintains a privileged relationship with time.

It is very important that Augustine also wants to reach the ultimate truth by the practice of introspection, by turning the soul towards itself—the metaphysical guarantee of the success of this procedure is that God created the soul in his own image (Augustine, 2007, p. 5–7). This means that the knowledge of self leads to the knowledge of God. As he writes in his dialogue *Soliloquies*, “God, always the same, let me know myself, let me know Thee” (Augustine, 1910, p. 51). An important aspect of the dialogue is that it is in fact a kind of logical inquiry: Augustine is talking to the personified Reason (Ratio), questioning it in order to arrive at the right insight. He also arrives at an understanding of the concept of time by analysing the relationship with God.

---

6 Here I refer primarily to the passage in Augustine’s (2000) *The City of God* (Book XI, Chapter 26) that emphasizes the connection between error and existence.
In his *Confessions*, Augustine (2005, p. 205–206) tries to answer the question of what God had done before he created the world. With some irony, he first answers that he had made hell for those who ask such questions. His final answer, of course, is that God himself had created time, all time being his creation. He then begins to wonder what time actually is. At this point he writes the famous lines: “if no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not” (Augustine, 2005, p. 207).

Without wishing to reconstruct the whole train of thought, I would just like to record that Augustine ultimately finds in the soul the inner bearer of the continuity of time, as it is the soul that is able to measure time:

> It is in thee, my mind, that I measure times. Interrupt me not, that is, interrupt not thyself with the tumults of thy impressions. In thee I measure times; the impression, which things as they pass by cause in thee, remains even when they are gone; this it is which still present, I measure, not the things which pass by to make this impression. This I measure, when I measure times. Either then this is time, or I do not measure times. (Augustine, 2005, p. 217)

Time, then, becomes understandable in terms of the anima, the concept of the substantive soul: the soul and time are intimately connected. Only the soul can measure and experience time, and the perception of time testifies to the presence of the soul. It is perhaps seemingly unjustified that I have given Augustine such a prominent role in the train of thought, but hopefully it is possible to see how strongly the interconnectedness of the substance soul and time appears in his oeuvres. In metaphysical thought, even long after Kant, the close association of self and time is still dominant; suffice it to mention Bergson (2001), for whom the deep self is essentially a temporal rather than a spatial phenomenon. This connection is significant despite Bergson’s critical attitude towards the metaphysical tradition, and, moreover, his refusal to measure time, unlike Augustine. The notion of time is also crucial in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, although he does not connect it with the substantive notion of the soul (Derrida, 1987, p. 78–79).

What is important for us now is a remark he made about Kant:

> The ostensibly new beginning of philosophizing betrays the imposition of a fatal prejudice. On the basis of this prejudice later times neglect a thematic ontological analysis of ‘the mind’ [Gemüt] which would be guided by the question of being; likewise they neglect a critical confrontation with the inherited ancient ontology. (Heidegger, 1996, p. 22)
In *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that Kant has adopted Descartes’ dogmatic, ontological position, and in this context points to the essentially scholastic nature of the Cartesian concept of *ens*. At the same time, he indicates that an analysis of the Gemüt (mind), which has never been carried out, could finally help to clarify the ontological status of the subject. But what is this Gemüt, and what is its role with regard to the concept of time in transcendental philosophy?

**The mind and time**

One of Immanuel Kant’s important innovations is that he does not link the experience of time to the concept of the soul as understood in the substantive sense, but to the mind. The Kantian mind is a relatively mysterious concept with no ontological background.

Kant defines the Gemüt as a capacity that coordinates the three higher faculties of knowledge, which has no substantive reference whatsoever (Caygill, 2009, p. 210–211). In a letter to the author of Soemmerring’s *On the Organ of the Soul*, Kant (2007c, p. 223; AA 12, p. 32) indicates that Gemüt is to be understood as animus (faculty) and not as anima (substance). Mind or disposition is thus an a priori faculty by which the subject brings together the higher faculties of reason, power of judgment and understanding, and forms its most elementary relation to its own existence without any empirical involvement (Kant, 2002, p. 89–90; AA 5, p. 203–204). The Gemüt is therefore not materially localizable: when we presume to locate the centre of the mind in something, we are in fact falling into the error of subreption: we presume to identify something that is exclusively intellectual in a sensuous way (Kant, 2007c, p. 90; AA 12, p. 32; Sng, 2010, p. 79–80).

The nature of the mind is simply not something that can be physiologically registered; just as it has an intrinsic existence, it has no material extension. At the same time, mind (by virtue of its faculty-coordinating nature) is at all times extremely open to the sensory world.

It is the Gemüt which, for Kant, makes possible the universal validity of subjectivity. Even in his critical period, the Königsberg master’s attitude to subjectivity underwent significant transformations, so that, for example, the status of the concept in his inaugural lecture is quite different from that in *Critique of Power of Judgment*. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1998, p. 685–686; AA 3, p. 532–533), he still considers the concurrence of the judgments of subjects to be objective and clearly assumes a common object behind identical judgments (which only subjectively rests on sufficient conditions, he calls it believing), but in the third critical work he allows for the possibility of subjective universality (not based on concepts). Here (Kant, 2002, p. 96–98; AA 5, p. 212–213), subjectivity is no longer identical with a pathological personhood based on private feelings, but allows for universal rules,
not comparative, which oblige each finite rational being to be equally pleasing. Kant establishes a concept of subjective generality that derives from the Gemüt, which can serve as a model for any concept of the subject conceived as a principled, universally valid concept. Even in this work, Kant still describes the logical generality as objectively valid (reserving the subjective adjective exclusively for aesthetics), but the two are really separated by an “as if” (Kant, 2002, p. 99–100; AA 5, p. 214–215). In other works published later, he emphasizes the subjective character of the logical self (e.g. Kant, 2007a, p. 246; AA 7, p. 135).

It is legitimate to ask what the Kantian mind has to do with time. For Kant, it is the mind that perceives the world in time. He does not find the foundation of temporal existence in the metaphysical concept of the soul, but understands it as an a priori endowment of the mind. This does not mean that the traditional concept of the soul has nothing to do with time.

Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, as an object; yet it is still a determinate form, under which the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time. Time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us. (Kant, 1998, p. 157; AA 3, p. 51–52)

Although we cannot theorize the soul as an object, Kant does not deny the existence of the soul. We form an idea of our inner being through time, but it remains an idea, we do not know the soul as a thing in itself.

The belief that we can justify our inaudible soul by the experience of time is debunked by Kant as paralogism. Kant calls the fallacy transcendental paralogism, in the process of which the subject makes a logical formal error that has a transcendental basis (Kant, 1998, p. 411–412; AA 3, p. 262–263). Perhaps the best example is Descartes’ (and rational psychology’s) fallacy of inferring from the apperception of “I think” a soul—anima—that exists substantively. In our case, we are dealing with the paralogism of personality: from my temporal identity I infer the existence of my soul (Kant, 1998, p. 422–423; AA 4, p. 228). From the identity of the consciousness of myself, however, I can legitimately infer only the formal conditions of my thoughts, the logical identity of the self, but the identity of the substance soul does not follow.

We have seen that in Kant (and in the transcendental philosophical tradition in general) the subject and time are closely but ambivalently related. In light of the above, how can this apparent contradiction or paradox be resolved? According to Kant, it is an a priori

---

Kirill Chepurin (2010) argues convincingly that Kant introduces a metaphysical model of the intensity of the soul as opposed to Mendelssohn’s traditional conception of substantial soul.
endowment of the mind to perceive in space and time the things around it; this can in fact be understood, as Schelling does, as the inherent subject creating time. This does not mean, of course, that the subject is outside time, but that by its presence it automatically posits time. The subject is both atemporal and temporal—this ambiguity can be called the antagonism of atemporal temporality, along the lines of Kantian unsociable sociability (Kant, 2007d, p. 111; AA 8, p. 20–21).

If we want to shed more light on this atemporal temporality, we can describe the relationship between the old metaphysical tradition and Kant in terms of the Copernican turn. Just as in Kant’s works, in the process of cognition, not the intuition conforms to the constitution of the objects, but the object “conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition” (Kant 1998, p. 110; AA 3, p. 12); so in the transcendental philosophical tradition it is not time that creates the subject, but the subject that creates time. 8 Whereas the characteristic of dogmatic thought was to posit the subject in time, in Kantian philosophy time is the most elementary manifestation and product of the subject. The antinomy of atemporal temporality is unresolvable because Kant does not go beyond the theorem of the mind to the theoretic presupposition of the soul. To resolve this dichotomy, he would have to engage in illegitimate metaphysical speculations about the nature of the soul.

Finally, it is worth noting that German idealism did not insist on the antagonism of atemporal temporality. Schelling’s thought took an ontological turn a year after the publication of The System of Transcendental Idealism, as a result of which he gradually moved away from transcendental philosophy in the critical sense. In his dialogue Bruno, for example, he describes the highest unity of thought and contemplation as having no relation to time (Schelling, 1984, 146). At the same time, the relation between time and the self is increasingly reminiscent of the relation postulated by dogmatic idealism rather than transcendentalism; Schelling stresses the metaphysical significance of the irreversibility of time (Vető, 2019, p. 897). The German Idealists and Romanticists, moving away from the transcendental turn, sought again metaphysical guarantees for the subject instead of mind with a non-ontological status. The ideal subject as soul lost its transcendental ambiguity, its atemporal temporality, and became a timeless being in finitude (Novalis, 2003, p. 66). The Romantics’ approximative desire for Absolute revived the concept of the immortal soul and created a tendency towards timelessness out of the antinomy of atemporal temporality (Frank, 2008, p. 179).

---

8 However, the mind is also what it is through time. As Heidegger writes in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics: “as the basis of the possibility of selfhood, time is already included in pure apperception and first enables the mind to be what it is” (Heidegger, 1965, p. 197).
References


Kant, I. (1900–). *Gesammelte Schriften* (AA). Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (vol. 1–22), Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (vol. 23), Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen (vol 24–).


Péter TÁNCZOS. Atemporal Temporality of the Transcendental Subject: Ambiguous Connection Between Subjectivity and Time in the Kantian–Schellingian Transcendental Philosophy


